Introduction
In Golosov and Lucas (GL 2007) money is neutral even when firms, facing menu costs, adjust their prices intermittently. They attribute this to a 'selection effect' -the firms that are resetting are those with prices furthest from equilibrium. In this paper I develop a discrete-time version of the GL model in which money is non-neutral. This is due to one very natural extension to the GL model: I allow price review costs and the direct costs of changing prices to play distinct roles in the pricing decision. The former are incurred when information is gathered and processed and when decisions are made; the latter ('menu costs'), are incurred only when prices are changed.
The distinction is important because there is substantial evidence that firms change their prices less frequently than they review them. This extension to the standard model sufficiently weakens the selection effect to give a degree of money non-neutrality similar to that of a model with Calvo (1983) pricing.
Money is non-neutral when the aggregate price level is slow to adjust.
Such price-level stickiness has been attributed to costs associated with changing prices. The presence of such costs provided new-Keynesians with just the micro-foundation that earlier Keynesian models lacked. And yet the new-Keynesian analysis of monetary policy is usually based on the simplifying assumption of Calvo: firms choose how much to change prices but not when. 1 Their timing is random. New Keynesians are left with the hope that the Calvo approach is close enough an approximation to a fully-specified menu-cost model to justify its use for the analysis of monetary policy. Unfortunately the standard menu-cost model, appropriately calibrated to match the micro-data, behaves rather unlike the Calvo model and the micro-foundations of Keynesian monetary policy would seem to be far from established.
In Caplin and Spulber's (1987) early menu-cost model, money is completely neutral because of the selection effect.
2 Firms that are re-setting are not drawn randomly -they are those with prices furthest from equilibrium.
Consider the effects of a positive monetary shock. Those firms with initial prices well below their equilibrium will reset and, when they do so, make large adjustments (to catch up). Firms with prices nearer their equilibrium values are unlikely to reset. The aggregate price level is an average of the large price adjustments of the re-setters and the zero adjustments of others. In Caplin and Spulber's model the average price level exactly keeps pace with the monetary shock, neutralising any aggregate real output effects. They show that while there may be firm-level stickiness in prices, the aggregate price level is not and, because of this, money is neutral.
GL find that the selection effect is also present in a fully-specified menucost model with idiosyncratic productivity. Calibrating their model to match observed patterns of price setting (as described in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) ), they find that the selection effect blunts the real effects of money -not completely, but substantially so. Acknowledging that the menu cost model can explain price stickiness at the firm level, GL argue that it does not offer new-Keynesians the micro foundation they seek.
2 Golosov and Lucas (2007) first coined the phrase 'selection effect'. Caballero and Engel (2007) argue that the key distinction is that between the 'extensive' and 'intensive' margins. In the former a money shock raises the price level through its effect on the fraction of firms making price adjustments. The intensive margin is the additional price increases of those firms that were going to adjust anyway. Only the intensive margin is active in the Calvo model, while in menu-cost models both margins are strictly positive.
And they find that the Calvo model, widely used in new-Keynesian analysis, is not a 'serviceable approximation to behaviour under menu costs.'
The standard menu-cost model can be challenged along two related lines. First it is simply not consistent with observed patterns of price changes in the micro data. And secondly, its description of the price-setting process and its associated costs is seriously incomplete. The first weakness concerns the failure of the standard model to account for the wide dispersion of price changes observed in the data. According to Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) , the average absolute change in those prices being re-set is around 10% and yet they find that 44% of price changes are less than 5% in absolute value. Since, in the standard menu-cost model, prices only adjust when they are some way from their equilibrium values, small price adjustments are only made if menucosts are small -too small for the model to remain consistent with other features of the data.
Recent menu-cost models have been more successful in explaining the wide dispersion of price changes in the micro-data. Several introduce some form of heterogeneity in menu costs. Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) assume that menu costs are stochastic so that those firms with small menu costs will adjust prices even when current prices are close to the equilibrium. Alvarez et al (2010) and Woodford (2009) refer to these costs as 'information' costs. My preference is for the wider term 'review costs' to stress the fact that it covers information gathering, information processing, decision-making -the costs of all activities involved in pricing decisions. 7 Midrigan's own answer is state-dependent, at least in US manufacturing. Yet he also makes clear that 'the terms time-and state-dependent pricing are somewhat obscured by the richness, in recent work, of models with nominal rigidities that employ elements of both of these price setting mechanisms.' 8 The fact that state-and time-dependency are closely interconnected may explain why firms have responded differently when asked directly about their pricing strategies. Fabiani et al (2006) investigate the pricing behaviour of more than 11,000 firms in the euro area on the basis of surveys conducted by nine Eurosystem national central banks. They find that 'around one-third of the respondents indicate that they follow mainly time-dependent rules, while twothirds use rules with state-dependent elements'. In their analysis of 654 UK companies in a Price reviews and price adjustments are both costly exercises and will, for that reason, occur infrequently. The evidence suggests that reviews are more frequent than adjustments -not all reviews lead to a change in price.
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Hall et al (2000) find that the median firm in their UK survey changed prices twice a year but reviewed prices every month (only 17% of reviews change prices). Using Euro-area data, Fabiani et al (2006) find that 'the modal number of price reviews ranges in most countries between one and three times per year, while the median firm in nearly all countries changes its price only once a year'. Alvarez et al (2010) review the survey evidence across a number of European and North American countries. They conclude: 'The median firm in the Euro area reviews its price a bit less than three times a year, but changes its price only about once a year, and similar for UK and US.' More precisely the median US firm reviews its price twice a year and changes it 1.4 times, suggesting that 30% of reviews do not lead to a change in price. Because of likely measurement errors associated with the median, Alvarez et al focus on the mass of US firms reviewing or changing their prices more than four times a year. Only 37% of these reviews led to price changes.
There is, then, substantial variation across countries and firms in the proportion of reviews that lead to price changes, but reviews are always more frequent than changes.
Bank of England survey, Hall et al (2000) report that 'time-dependent pricing was more common than state-dependent pricing, with 79% of the respondents reporting that they reviewed their prices at a specific frequency'. Analysing similar data for the US, Blinder et al (1998) observe that 60% of their respondents said that they had 'periodic price reviews' (which they interpret as a time-dependent pricing strategy). 9 It is possible for price adjustments to be more frequent than reviews. This would be the case if prices were indexed. It would also be the case if, following a review, a time-schedule of prices was set in place.
Alvarez et al obtain interesting analytical results from a model that allows the firm's pricing strategy to be influenced by both review costs and menucosts. They argue that the observed micro evidence on price-setting (including the frequencies of price reviews and price changes) can potentially be explained using the level and relative magnitudes of review and menu costs. The model in this paper is similar in spirit to theirs but the analysis of the two costs is set in a stochastic general equilibrium framework set up to analyse the aggregate effects of monetary shocks.
Information costs also play an important role in Woodford's (2009) model which is also similar in spirit to that developed in this paper. Firms pay for a noisy signal (of current market conditions) and, using this signal, they decide whether or not to review their price. When the signal leads to a review, the firm gathers the complete set of information that is required to set a new price, a price which stays in effect until the next review. Although price-setting is purely state-dependent, the model's macroeconomic implications are similar to those of a Calvo model. The model has one important weakness: it fails to explain why the frequency of price reviews in the data exceeds that of price adjustments since, in Woodford's analysis, prices are always adjusted when a review takes place. There are no direct costs of changing prices, just information costs.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the following section I identify seven key features of the micro data, features which the review-cost 10 Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) also focus on information costs in a model that treats the contract length as endogenous. And, like Woodford, they ignore menu costs so firms that review their prices invariably re-set them, an assumption which is at variance with the micro data.
model should explain. In section 3 I extend GL's model to allow review and menu costs to exert separate influences on the firm's pricing decision. The main results are presented and discussed in section 4 and a final section offers a summary and conclusion.
The Micro Evidence
Three recent papers have analysed datasets on firms' pricing behaviour.
Midrigan (2010) KK report that the mean absolute change in regular prices is around 10%; NS find this to be a little lower at 8.5%.
3. Notwithstanding (2), KK and M find that a significant number of price changes are small. KK report that 44% are less than 5% in absolute value, M reporting a lower figure of 25%. M estimates the standard deviation of regular (absolute) price changes to be 8%, 25% of changes are less than half the mean and 8% are less than a quarter of the mean. There is, then, considerable dispersion in the distribution of price changes.
4. Even for individual items, price durations vary considerably over time.
13
KK report that the standard deviation of completed 'contract lengths' is 7 months within 'ELIs' and 5.2 months within 'quote lines'. 14 5. KK find that the size of absolute price changes is not related to the interval of time since they were last re-set. I report (below) the correlation between the absolute change in reset prices and the time since they were last reset as . The data suggests this should be small.
12 NS highlight the substantial heterogeneity in re-setting frequency across sectors, from over 90% per month in some sectors to less than 5% in others. GL calibrate using a re-set frequency of 21.9%. 13 Dixon and Kara (2010) develop a 'Generalized Taylor' model in which contract periods vary across firms but not over time. Their model thus fails to explain the fourth feature of the micro data. 14 ELIs are entry-level items, and quote lines are particular items within the ELIs.
6. KK report that the intensive margin (the size of price changes) rather than the extensive margin (the fraction of items with price changes)
dominates variations in inflation. They report the correlation ( ) between inflation and the fraction of prices being re-set to be 0.25 and the correlation ( ) between inflation and average change in reset prices to be 0.99.
7. The last feature of the price data concerns the relative frequencies of price reviews and price adjustments: not all reviews lead to adjustments. As we have seen, Alvarez et al (2010) report substantial survey variation in the fraction of reviews that are followed by price adjustments. However, the qualitative evidence is clear -there are always more reviews than there are adjustments.
KK demonstrate that standard state-and time-dependent pricing models fail to explain one or more of these features of the micro data. Second generation state-dependent models have been more successful, but none explain why price reviews are intermittent and more frequent than price adjustments. The extended GL model I develop in the next section does just that.
Time Dependency in a State-Dependent Model
In this section I add review costs into an otherwise standard GL model so I begin with a description of a discrete-time (monthly) version of their model.
The Standard Menu-Cost Model
Households consume a continuum of differentiated products, of unit measure, indexed z. The Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz composite consumption good takes the now-familiar form,
is the household consumption of good z at date t and ε is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods.
GL derive the demand function facing the firm producing good z as,
is the firm's price, t w is the economy-wide wage rate at which all firms are assumed to hire labour, 15 α is the disutility of labour; γ is the degree of risk aversion. Equation (1) may then be written,
The presence of t c in (2) means that, strictly, it should be treated as a statevariable but its behaviour (from (1)) is not known. GL conjecture that if wage inflation were constant, (3) would be a time-invariant constant at some level . c They find that the constant-c assumption is a good approximation even for a model with stochastic wage inflation.
The firm's profit function is,
is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm changes its price in period t and zero otherwise; k is the real menu cost -the hours of labour needed to change price; and ) (z v t is labour productivity in firm z.
16
Expressed in units of the money wage, using equation (2) and assuming that the consumption composite is constant at c , ( ) 
The firm maximizes profits discounted at a constant rate β so that the real value (V) function of the firm is given by the solution to, 
The implied assumption of GL's profit function (4) is that price-reviews are continuous and costless. Each month, in the discrete-time version of the model, the firm costlessly determines the equilibrium price and incurs a menu-17 Equation (3a) is solved by a simple iterative procedure. First guess a value for c , solve firms' prices given this value, update c from (3a) and continue until convergence. cost only if the price is actually adjusted. There are no costs associated with information gathering, information processing and the pricing decision itself.
A Menu-Cost Model with Review Costs
Now consider the case where price reviews are costly. Maintaining the fixedc assumption 18 , I re-write the profit function as,
is an indicator variable that takes the value one if prices are reviewed that month and zero otherwise; η is the ratio of the price review cost to the menu cost. 19 I assume that price changes can only occur when reviews take
. When a review does take place
can be zero or one. Price reviews are now likely to be intermittent, the more so with higher values for η . In Woodford (2009) firms always change prices when a full review is suggested by the signal of market conditions. If no such signal were available (or available at infinite cost), how should the firm behave? Consider a firm that makes three decisions in every price review: (i) should it change its price? (ii) what price to set if (i) is affirmative; and (iii) when next to review. 18 In the numerical simulations reported in the following section, c was estimated to be 0.3837001 for the η = 6 case. The standard deviation of the absolute variation of c around this (estimated over 30,000 firms and 2,000 months) was 0.000456. This suggests that the fixed-c assumption is a good approximation in the extended model also. 19 We know that there is, in the data, considerable heterogeneity in review intervals, suggesting that η might also vary across firms. In this paper I limit myself to constant menu costs and review costs. Allowing both some measure of heterogeneity will further strengthen the model's ability to capture features of the micro-data.
Dropping the firm index for notational convenience, the real value function of the firm can then be written as, 21 In the interval between reviews, the firm's relative price will be expected to decline by the anticipated rate of wage inflation. Like Woodford, I
do not allow for price indexation or the possibility of a pre-determined price schedule over the review interval. Nominal prices remain unchanged between reviews. Also like Woodford I make the implicit assumption that no costless information is available and this is clearly an important weakness of the model. The arrival of such information may well lead firms to bring forward the date of the planned review. If review costs were dominated by information processing and decision costs, the assumption of a pre-set review interval is less objectionable. In this model the firm cannot change the date of the next review -the costs of doing so always exceed the benefits.
20 Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) assume the time interval is constant for any given monetary policy regime and analyze its change over time when a regime switch occurs. 21 Unlike time-dependent pricing models (like Taylor (1980) , Calvo (1983) or Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) ), the timing of price reviews is still influenced by the current state variables.
I solve the firm's problem (6) by value function iteration on a grid, and follow NS in approximating the processes for t w and ) (z v t using a method suggested by Tauchen (1986) . 22 Review intervals are assumed to be whole months and in the range 1-12 months. Optimal review intervals are always within this range for all cases considered. When the review takes place, prices may not always be adjusted, so the frequency of reviews will always exceed the frequency of price changes, as it does in the micro-data.
Integrating (2) an average annual wage-money growth rate of around 3%. According to Franco and Philippon (2007) , idiosyncratic productivity shocks are highly persistent and they account for a substantial proportion of the variance of overall productivity. Compared with other menu-cost models, I assume a higher degree of persistence of the productivity shock and set = 0.9.
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A key parameter is clearly η, implicitly zero in GL. Zbaracki et al (2004) report that 'managerial costs are more than 6 times … the physical costs associated with changing prices' (p. 515), so = 6 can be considered a lower 24 An alternative definition of the aggregate output gap would be to take the mean over all firms' gaps. The time average of this measure would be zero. The mean of g over time is typically negative since (by Jensen's inequality), the difference in means is not equal to the mean of differences. 25 In their monthly model NS set = 0.66.
bound for this parameter. I also report results for = 20. 26 The remaining two parameters (k, ) were chosen to match the first two characteristics of the seven outlined in section 2:
• The frequency of price changes is around 14%.
• The absolute values of price changes that do occur are typically in the range 8.5% -10%.
I then compare each model's performance in matching the other five empirical features described in section 2.
Results
The results are set out in Tables 1 and 2 , the first covering pricing behaviour and the second the macroeconomic implications. Consider first the standard menu-cost model, the results of which are given in the column headed 'GL'. In this model = 0, so price reviews take place costlessly each month, the firm incurring menu-costs only when prices are actually changed. Because the model is calibrated to mimic re-set frequencies and their size, these closely match the data (the shaded rows in Table 1 ). Setting k to 0.014 and to 0.04, the price reset frequency is 13.8%, and the mean absolute change of reset prices is 9.4%, both sufficiently close to the calibration targets. The model also succeeds in capturing the observed variation in price contract lengths: the standard deviation of contracts is 6.5 months compared with the 5-7 month range reported by KK. And the correlation between the absolute 26 Gertler and Leahy (2008) assume that firms incur a 'decision cost' just large enough to prevent them from changing prices in the absence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks which follow a Poisson process. Although they require a small decision cost 'for technical reasons', they acknowledge that the evidence suggests that such costs are substantially higher than those incurred when changing prices.
change in reset prices and the time since they were last reset ( in Table 1) is weak, as it is in the data.
Predictably the standard menu-cost model fails to account for the substantial dispersion in price changes. The standard deviation of price changes is 2% compared with 8% in the data. And the percentages of small price adjustments are well short of those in the data: in the GL model only 0.03% of price changes are less than half the mean compared 25% in M's data.
From Table 2 To summarize: in the monthly discrete-time version of GL's standard menu-cost model, money is close to being neutral through the selection effect, but the model fails to capture the substantial dispersion in price changes observed in the data.
Two versions of the review-cost model are presented, one where review costs are 6 times as large as menu costs and one where the ratio is 20. To achieve the price reset incidence, mean review frequencies are 17.5% for the low review cost ratio case and 16.7% for the high ratio case. The review intervals in both cases are in the range 5 -6 months (marginally longer when = 20). 28 When = 6 and reviews more frequent, 77% of them lead to price changes. This rises to 87% for the case of the more expensive and less frequent reviews. Both cases struggle to capture the dispersion in price 'contracts', the standard deviations of 'contract length' being short of KK's range, 5-7%.
The review-cost model does explain the wide dispersion of price adjustments and it is this that is crucial in reducing the selection effect as
Midrigan (2010) The key macroeconomic implications of review costs are set out in Table   2 . Both versions of the model come close to explaining the roles of the intensive and extensive margins of inflation. The standard deviation of the output gap is 3.4 times that of the GL model. 30 To further appreciate the role played by infrequent reviews, I consider an identical economy where firms review monthly and re-set conventionally, taking into account only the costs of changing prices. The results are given in the row labelled 'monthly review' in Table 2 . The standard deviation of the output gap of an economy populated by such firms is between 2% and 7% that of an economy populated by firms reviewing infrequently. And the persistence of the output gap and inflation rate of an economy of monthly reviewers is substantially below that of an economy of infrequent reviewers. The review-cost model sufficiently weakens the selection effect to restore monetary non-neutrality, as the two regression results illustrate. In the case of the quarterly regressions, the coefficient on wage inflation is four times that of the GL model.
The last column of both tables presents the results of a Calvo model, where the firms review randomly with a probability of just over 0.14. 31 Some price reviews leave the nominal price unchanged; 96% of them lead to a price change. The standard deviations of price durations and changes are very close to those observed in the data. The Calvo model predictably fails in two 30 The standard deviation of the output gap is in the range 0.20% -0.29% for the review-cost model, close to Midrigan's consumption standard deviation of 0.29% for his benchmark case. 31 As a small number of reviews will not change prices, a review incidence of above 0.14 is required to achieve the 14% reset frequency target.
areas. First it implies an overly-strong correlation between the size of the price change and the time is was last re-set ( 1 ρ ). And secondly (from Table 2 
Summary and Conclusions
Golosov and Lucas (2007) have challenged the view that infrequent price adjustment by firms explains why money has aggregate real output effects.
The basis of their challenge is the 'selection effect' -re-setting firms are not selected at random, they are those firms whose prices are furthest from their equilibrium levels and who therefore make substantial adjustments when their prices are changed. Like Caplin and Spulber (1987) For example Klenow and Kryvtsov find that the mean absolute price change is around 10% but 44% of prices changes are less than 5% in absolute value. In the Golosov and Lucas model, small price changes simply do not occur.
A number of papers have extended the standard model to explain the wide dispersion in price changes, and when they do so the selection effect is sufficiently weakened to restore the non-neutrality of money. Midrigan (2010), for example, assumes that productivity shocks have pronounced kurtosis and firms enjoy economies of scope, taking the opportunity to change all their prices when strict menu-cost considerations justify re-setting only one. These two extensions to the standard model weaken the selection effect and restore the real effects of money to a level close to that of the Calvo model.
In this paper I have offered another explanation for the wide dispersion of price changes and the weakness of the selection effect. Price-setting involves two distinct costs: review costs (information gathering, processing, decision-taking) and menu costs (the direct costs of physically changing prices). The standard menu-cost model (implicitly) assumes that reviews are continuous and costless -it is only costly to change prices. The micro data suggests otherwise. Price reviews are intermittent and far more costly than price adjustments. And they do not always lead firms to change their prices. Alvarez et al (2010) find that 'the median firm in the Euro area reviews its price a bit less than three times a year, but changes its price only about once a year'. A similar pattern holds in US data.
The model developed in this paper allows price review costs and menu costs to play distinct roles in the pricing decision. Review costs are added to an otherwise standard Golosov and Lucas menu-cost model. In the extended model, when a firm reviews its price it (i) decides whether or not to change it and by how much; and (ii) sets the date of the next review. Both decisions are state-dependent, i.e. influenced by the firm's inherited price and its current productivity. Because the selection effect is weak, the non-neutrality of money is similar to that of a model with the Calvo pricing. The Golosov and Lucas critique evaporates once the price-setting process and its associated costs are correctly specified. 
Notes:
The results reported in the table are based on simulated aggregations of 30,000 firms over 2,000 months.
is the correlation between the inflation rate and the fraction of prices being reset.
is the correlation between the inflation rate and the mean change in those prices which are being reset. is the standard deviation of the output gap. Persistence is the simple correlation coefficient of the variable with its one-month lagged value. 
